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Ladies and Gentlmen, Dear Colleagues,1
This conference is devoted to the history of dissent 
in the former Soviet Union, and I, as a former Ukrainian 
dissident, would like to use this opportunity to offer a 
special introductory reflection. It is my moral duty and 
great personal privilege to thank all those who made our 
mission possible: those who risked their diplomatic 
or professional positions by meeting with us in that 
“empire of evil”; those who transferred our materials to 
the free world; the ones who helped our voices be heard; 
all those who gave us their invaluable support. Here, 
I mean governments and ordinary citizens, diplomats 
and journalists, editors and media communicators, 
cultural figures and religious communities. I mean 
people of varied ethnic origins (in my case, Ukrainian) 
living in diaspora, but also those whose connection with 
Ukrainian or Russian, Baltic or Caucasian cultures had 
been established simply through human solidarity and 
compassion. Let their efforts be blessed, let their support 
be never forgotten. On behalf of all former dissidents, 
I would like to express our deep gratitude to our well- 
known, and maybe still unknown, beneficiaries, and I ask 
you to be the recipients and mediators of this gratitude.
Toward a History of the Resistance
Movement
The genesis of the Ukrainian dissident movement 
was twofold, predetermined by the twofold nature of 
the Soviet regime, both as a totalitarian state and as 
the Russian Empire camouflaged under the communist 
“union.”
On the one hand, the dissident movement was an 
attempt to provide serious resistance to the totalitarian 
state and aimed at the democratization of the society. In 
this sense, Ukrainian dissidents shared the position of 
all Soviet dissidents and had the Russian human rights 
circles in Moscow as an example to follow. And let me 
say at the very beginning: the support of our colleagues 
in Moscow was invaluable. At its early stages, the cross-
Soviet dissident movement had been fed by the hopes 
generated by the debunking of the so-called “cult of
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Stalin” after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party 
(1956) and by a certain democratization often addressed as 
the “Khruschev thaw.” A crisis of the official communist 
identity occurred: the former Stalinist ideological 
standards had been reconsidered and the official history 
of the state had been rewritten. Belief in the justice of 
the Soviet system had been damaged, but not fatally. The 
most active core of the dissident movement at that time 
consisted of optimistic and, to some extent, idealistic 
communists who wished that “distortions of the Lenin 
official policy” be removed and the existing system to be 
transformed into “communism with a human face.”
On the other hand, the Ukrainian dissident movement 
derived its inspiration from the liberation struggle of 
Ukrainians, which had grown markedly in the first 
half of the twentieth century. In some sense, it was a 
continuation of this struggle, but using different means. 
The movement for cultural, religious, and, later, civil 
rights had objectively weakened the Moscow colonial 
regime and, therefore, promoted independent trends 
within various subjugated nations. This liberational 
aspect made Ukrainian (like Lithuanian, Georgian and 
other) dissidents different from Russian dissidents who 
often considered national movements (including the 
Ukrainian one) to be “not truly democratic” and “polluted 
with national/nationalistic demands..
Therefore, the Ukrainian dissident movement also 
included those politically-oriented figures for whom the
struggle for human rights was a promising instrument for
achieving the main goal - the political independence of 
Ukraine - rather than a “religion of their soul.” They prefer 
even to use the term “resistance movement” instead of 
“dissident movement”; they deliberately avoid defining 
themselves as “dissidents,” preferring to be addressed as 
“political prisoners” or “fighters for the independence of 
Ukraine.”
The Ukrainian dissident movement underwent 
several phases of development. The first one was the 
period of romantic hopes and this started in the public 
sphere with the foundation of free cultural clubs at the 
beginning of the 1960s in Kyiv and Lviv. During their 
discussions, intellectuals cautiously expressed opinions 
on literature and culture that differed from the official 
ones. This period lasted until the first arrests of 1965, 
which were used by the government to put an end to 
dangerous freethinking.
The second period could be called a period of 
confusion and depression. The phase of public protests
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against arrests gave way to embarrasment and confusion. 
People hoped (although with less and less conviction that 
those arrests were simply a mistake. This period lasted 
until the second wave of arrests in 1972-73.
The third period was, therefore, one of reorientation. 
Of course, many people were disappointed and 
experienced despair because illusions about the 
humanitarian evolution of the regime were completely 
shattered while the “light at the end of a tunnel” had not 
yet appeared. However, the disposition of dissidents had 
been radicalized, and it became clearly visible in the 
materials of samvydav (the Ukrainian equivalent of the 
Russian samizdat), that is, oppositionist literature illegally 
printed at home on a typewriter. Cautious culturological 
freethinking had been gradually replaced by substantial 
criticism of the regime and the ever more resolute 
conclusion concerning the inevitability of change.
At that period, the broader name “Ukrainian 
dissidents” defined a diverse group of the “non-agreeing” 
consisting of: a reasonable intelligentsia which dreamt, 
first of all, about freedom of expression; human rights 
activists who responded to the international human rights 
call; and political fighters who expressed their longing 
for the change of the regime and for the independence 
of Ukraine.
The fourth period of the dissident movement in 
Ukraine was inspired by the 1975 Helsinki Accords, 
signed by members of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including the USSR. The 
first Group for Promoting the Fulfillment of Helsinki 
Accords was founded on May 12, 1976, in Moscow. The 
Ukrainian Helsinki Group was next. It was founded on 
November 9, 1976, by a group of ten dissidents, myself 
included, headed by the writer Mykola Rudenko. The 
Group published its Declaration in theWestern media, 
proclaiming its purely human rights, non-underground 
nature and, following the example of the Moscow Group, 
providing names and addresses of its members.
Very soon, it became clear, however, that non-
underground groups were even more dangerous for 
the Soviet regime than those underground. After three 
months of hesitation, the KGB decided to punish the 
Ukrainian Helsinki Group members for “spreading anti-
Soviet propaganda aimed at undermining the Soviet state 
and social order” - the crime considered, according to the 
USSR Criminal Code, to be the “most dangerous state 
crime.” During the next few years, authorities arrested 
eight Ukrainian Helsinki Group members, myself 
included, and expelled from the country another two. 
The persecutions had not frightened the “non-agreeing”; 
instead, they served to mobilize a protest movement 
in Ukrainian society. As a result, during the 1980s, the 
Group experienced two more waves of “kamikaze” 
membership which were inevitably persecuted. Today it 
is being suggested that there were 41 Ukrainian Helsinki 
Group members in total. The Group had never announced 
its dissolution and continued its activities either in prison 
or abroad. For the whole period of the Ukrainian Helsinki 
Group's existence, only one renunciation (Oles Berdnyk)
and one suicide (Mykhaylo Melnyk) took place. On 
July 7, 1988 (that is, during the time of Gorbachev's 
perestroika) some members of the Ukrainian Helsinki 
Group declared the foundation of the Ukrainian Helsinki 
Union with clear political goals. The latter, in fact, was 
the prototype of a political party.
At the time of Ukrainian independence, members 
of the 1960-80 Ukrainian resistance movement had 
become differentiated according to different socio-
political orientations. Those who were working to change 
the system headed the political opposition and made 
political careers. They became members of parliament 
and leaders of political parties. The smaller portion of 
dissidents, again myself included, refused to take part in 
political activities and continued to defend human rights 
or act in the cultural or religious field. Finally, a third 
group of former dissident, either because of their age or 
health problems, withdrew from any activity, limiting 
themselves only to participation in some public events.
The diversity of different political orientations 
chosen by former dissidents met harsh criticism later 
on. Instead of one consolidated opposition party, it was 
a conglomeration of rival groups for the most part united 
around former dissident leaders who stood in opposition 
to the Communists. This was considered to be a weakness 
(or even a particular fault) of the dissident movement 
because its diversity resulted in conflictual divisions. In 
fact, the dissident movement had never been monolithic 
and, therefore, could not satisfy all people's expectations. 
Indeed, dissidents were united, first of all, in the non-
acceptance of the imperial and totalitarian communist 
system, though each of them viewed the future 
development of Ukraine differently.
The importance of the dissident movement, at least 
in Ukraine, lies in the fact that just as a chemical particle 
can crystallize an oversaturated solution, the appearance 
of dissidents allowed the crystallization of people's 
expectations and their disobedience. As Andrey Amalrik 
accurately said, they . made a brilliantly simple thing 
- in a country that was not free, they began to act as free 
people and, because of that, started to change the moral 
atmosphere and the traditions that ruled the country.” 
Their merits in this are invaluable and beyond doubt.
At the same time (unlike in the Czech Republic) 
Ukrainian dissidents did not lead their society to the 
final victory of democracy. The victories they achieved 
were temporary, and their enormous passionate energy 
was misused by other political forces. However, in 
spite of the evident human weakness and failures of the 
Ukrainian dissidents, one should not censure them. This 
is because the third wave of democratization (according 
to Huntington) ran up against the invisible, but very real, 
cultural “wall” that existed between the two cultural 
civilizations, namely, the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian 
ones. Ukrainian dissidents were not able to overcome 
this wall in principle.
Difficulties of subsequent decades lead me to the 
conclusion that the task of all Ukrainians who want a 
better country must lie in the creation of an intermediary
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body that will not allow destructive conflict to pull apart 
both civilizations but will rather transfer mechanically 
Euro-Atlantic models of democracy into a qualitatively 
different Euro-Asian civilization. This would permit the
fulfillment of a two-fold task. First, in this way the unity
of the Ukrainian nation - which is predestined to exist 
on both sides of the “barricade” - can be safeguarded. 
Secondly, by fulfilling this national task Ukraine at the 
same time may fulfill the civilization task of harmonization 
of two cultural worlds.
Values of Dissidents and the Present Time
Today Ukrainian dissidents may simultaneously 
take pride in their participation in manifest national 
democratic achievements and yet be in despair about no 
less evident moral failures.
One of the most important values supported by 
fighters of the movement of resistance was freedom: 
civil, national, religious freedom and the freedom of self-
expression. These goals were mainly achieved though 
everything can be understood relatively.
Until the year 2010 the level of civic freedoms was 
much higher than that in Soviet times. In the country there 
was real freedom of the press though it was based not 
on the existence of the middle class, which is relatively 
weak in Ukraine, but rather on the reality of political 
clans. The major achievement of Ukrainian democracy, 
especially after the Orange Revolution, was freedom of 
elections, though electoral legislation had some holes 
that made some falsification and manipulation of voices 
possible. Finally, the fate of Ukrainian democracy seems 
to be that of all weak democracies. As a result of the free 
elections of 2010, those who came to power are actively 
changing the legislation to avoid losing power in the 
future. Therefore, weak democracy has logically been 
transformed into an imitative democracy.
Violations of human rights did not disappear - they 
only changed their character. Ukrainian authorities 
still infringe upon human dignity which leads to the 
diminishment of the scope of people's rights and the level 
of citizens' responsibility. Corruption is destroying the 
state system of justice and the courts. Thus, the former 
dissidents cannot rest on their laurels.
Ukrainian independence was achieved, but due to 
various factors the actual independence has become 
considerably weakened. The inner inter-regional 
differences that ought to be viewed as a potential richness 
for a state in harmony assume contradictory forms that 
are hard to overcome. These differences are being 
abused by some political forces who incite one part of 
the nation against the other. This also influences the 
geopolitical position of Ukraine because it happens to 
be divided into two parts. One part of Ukrainian society 
has chosen a Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation 
wanting to legitimately join the EU and find shelter in 
a collective security system, above all NATO, from the 
neoimperialistic aspirations of Russia. Incidentally, this 
is exactly the position most dissidents identify themselves
with. The other part of Ukrainian society considers itself 
to belong to the Russian (Eurasian) cultural region. 
This makes Ukraine more vulnerable, with its energy 
dependence on Russia. In this case the concept of the 
geopolitical security of Russia does not presuppose the 
true independence of Ukraine.
Inter-ethnic peace is being maintained in Ukraine 
and the freedom of ethnic minorities is, for the most part, 
safeguarded. In this sense, the goal of the dissidents has 
been fulfilled. However, the inertia of the previous Soviet 
model “Russian and Russian-speaking majority vs. non-
Russian minorities” is still very much present. According 
to this model, Ukrainians were a discriminated minority. 
After twenty years of independence Ukrainians have 
not succeeded in the realization of their status of ethnic 
majority and in safeguarding their cultural rights in certain 
regions in Ukraine, that is, in the East and South of the 
country and in Crimea. Moreover, after the 2010 elections 
the counter-offensive of Russian-speaking politicians 
began to take place. In order to safeguard the comfort 
of a one-language (Russian) regime they demagogically 
insist that there are two official languages in Ukraine - 
Ukrainian and Russian. In addition, these political forces 
attempt to misuse international mechanisms developed 
for defending weaker, or vanishing, languages to 
safeguard the monopoly of the Russian language which 
is strong even without this ploy. This not only foils the 
expectations of dissidents that in an independent state 
Ukrainian culture and language will have the opportunity 
to develop freely, but also the counter-offensive of these 
Russian-speaking “extremes” move Ukraine away from a 
balanced harmony between the titular nation and ethnic 
minorities which was also the dream of the dissidents.
One of the most obvious achievements of Ukrainian 
democracy was (and, I hope, still is) the progress in the 
sphere of religious freedom. Thanks to some parity 
between different religious and confessional groups this 
freedom demonstrated an ability for self-stablization and 
self-adjustment. Certain dissidents played an important 
personal role in the revival of previously persecuted 
religious organizations and in initiating inter-religious 
and inter-confessional cooperation. During the year 2010 
there was also an attempt of pro-Russian forces to turn 
this situation back to the past by giving some preferences 
to the Moscow Patriarchate. The idea of the “Russian 
world” developed by Patriarch Kirill I of Moscow is 
being used by the Moscow Patriarchate and its supporters 
in state authorities to make the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate the established 
church of Ukraine and press back all of its rivals. The 
religious rights of some Orthodox rivals of the Moscow 
Patriarchate have obviously been violated. However, I 
believe that putting the genie of religions back into the 
bottle of the Third Rome will be most difficult.
Thus, in many spheres of national existence the 
dissident mission has been successful, but it has not 
become irreversible and has not received the necessary 
legislative and system guarantees. Therefore, the question 
of its future importance for the nation is still open.
14
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
There are two spheres, however, in which this 
mission met with deadly failure: the dissident belief in 
establishing the rule of law and in the post-communist 
revival of social and personal ethics. The injustice and 
immorality of the communist period has been reproduced 
under different ideological slogans but, at the same 
time, has even been strengthened in certain areas. The 
old mechanisms of regulating injustice and immorality 
have lost their efficiency, but new ones have not been 
developed. The court system has become the instrument 
of the ruling authorities for settling accounts with the 
opposition. Mass corruption undermines the self-
confidence of the nation in the possibility of influencing 
the course of events and making social recovery possible. 
The Orange Revolution managed to revive the hope of 
part of the nation in their own abilities, but not for long.
Solzhenitzen's old slogan “not to live a lie” remains 
a dream. In spite of all the achievements in the sphere of 
freedom of speech, modern Ukraine does not live the truth. 
As I mentioned earlier, freedom of speech and the press 
is based on a variety of clans, each of whom, according 
to its own interests, speaks only a part of the truth, and 
at the same time adulterates it with propagandistic lies. 
Therefore, a whole set of semi-truths are in circulation in 
the country and this causes confusion among the people 
and is accepted by them as one big untruth.
Few people in Ukraine nowadays believe in the 
possibility of building a just order. The weakness of 
civil society permits economic and ministerial abuse. 
The crisis of the court system engenders feelings of being 
defenceless. Thus, the dissidents' hopes of establishing 
the rule of law have not been fulfilled.
This raises a question about the correctness of the 
dissidents' position taken after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the matter of bringing communists to justice 
for the crimes of the communist regime. In retrospect we 
now realize that it was not possible, contrary to dissidents' 
beliefs, to start with a “blank page.” Non-repentance for 
the sins of the communists and non-punishment for their 
crimes quite naturally resulted in the abuses committed 
by later administrations. As a result, legal nihilism has 
developed in the nation, and the national discourse easily 
adapts to clan loyalty and servility. Untruths and cunning 
behavior are tolerated.
One more belief of the Soviet opposition as a whole 
also failed, namely, the belief that post-communist 
governments would be wiser and more intellectual. In 
Ukraine today intellectuals try to formulate new and 
prospective strategies of development, but the latter 
cannot be fulfilled because of the closed nature of the 
ruling powers. The authorities use intellect only for their 
political egos.
Voices of rare moral authorities (for example, 
the voice of Yevhen Sverstiuk) are also less effective. 
Because of the self-isolation of the ruling elite in the 
fortress of power these voices cry out in the desert in 
vain. The weakness of their voices is caused not because 
the nation allegedly does not share their conclusions 
about the moral degradation of the ruling elite. According
to some studies more than 55 percent of those surveyed 
mentioned moral degradation as the main reason for the 
present social problems of Ukraine. The real problem lies 
in the fact that people are not eager to be in opposition to 
legal and moral highhandedness because it seems to them 
that without people's solidarity it would be too dangerous, 
unprofitable and, consequently, unattractive.
Under these circumstances Ukraine needs a new 
solidarity civic movement - a movement for the 
implementation of the rule of law and for the moral 
recovery of the society. The ability of former dissidents 
to initiate such a movement is limited: some of them 
are too old; others, because of political compromises of 
previous years, have ceased to be moral authorities for 
the nation. So the question remains open as to who will 
lead this, in my opinion, inevitable civic movement in 
the future.
Instead we may rather firmly state that former 
dissidents laid down the main precondition for that 
- the life of freedom. During the last two decades the 
Ukrainian nation has moved through a valuable school 
of freedom. And even if the experience achieved is 
partially negative, it is still invaluable for the ability of 
an individual to mature from the totalitarian “vice” to the 
level of a responsible citizen.
Dr. Myroslav Marynovych, former Ukrainian 
dissident and prisoner of conscience, is currently Vice-
rector for the University Mission of the Ukrainian 
Catholic University (L'viv, Ukraine).
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